GeoPolitics

A June 17 US-Iran memorandum required Iran to restore free commercial passage through the Strait of Hormuz within 30 days, but UKMTO data from July 23–29 recorded as few as one cargo or tanker crossing per day against a historical average of 138. Gulf Arab states are now looking to China, which buys roughly 74% of Hormuz crude bound for Asia, to apply economic pressure on Tehran, though no formal government-to-government request has been publicly documented and Beijing has made no specific concession. China's economic exposure gives it a plausible channel for influence, but its willingness to use that leverage against Iran remains undemonstrated.

A July 2026 Center for Strategic and International Studies analysis estimates US Patriot interceptor inventories fell roughly 65% from a pre-war baseline of approximately 2,200, leaving fewer than 1,000 missiles, while THAAD stocks dropped to around 250 from an estimated 452. Congressional testimony from the Missile Defense Agency director confirmed hundreds of THAAD interceptors were expended and noted the first-ever combat use of SM-3 Block IIA, though neither the Pentagon nor official budget documents have confirmed the specific depletion figures. The gap between think-tank estimates and official silence leaves the actual state of US missile defense readiness unverified by any public government source.

Seven OPEC+ producers are scheduled to meet virtually on August 2, 2026, to assess compliance with production targets and compensation plans for overproduction dating back to January 2024, with the deadline for full compensation now extended to December 2026. IEA data for June 2026 shows Kazakhstan and Oman as the only two participants producing above their implied targets, while Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Algeria all came in below. The meeting occurs against a backdrop of partially restored Strait of Hormuz tanker flows still running well below pre-war averages, and a Russian export ban on gasoline and diesel extended through January 31, 2027.